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A Deweyan Approach to the
Dilemma of Everyday Aesthetics
Thomas Leddy
1 I argue for a Deweyan approach to everyday aesthetics (Dewey 1934/1989, hereafter
LW.10). Everyday aesthetics is a new sub-discipline of aesthetic theory that has only
been actively discussed since the 1980s. Although I borrow many ideas from Dewey in
my approach to  everyday  aesthetics  there  are  two key  principles  that  sum up the
Deweyan  nature  of  the  approach  I  take.  First,  there  is  a  continuity  between  the
aesthetics of everyday life and the aesthetics of art. Second, the relationship between
the aesthetics of everyday life and the aesthetics of art is dynamic. In this paper I will
focus on the first of these. In course of my discussion I question such dichotomies as
that between the practical and the aesthetic, the ordinary and the extraordinary, and
disinterestedness vs. engagement.1 In my view, the dilemma is only real for those who
wish to maintain relatively rigid distinctions within these dichotomies. The dilemma is
only a dilemma if you think there is something disturbing about the thought that low-
level aesthetic experiences are enhanced when attended to and when understood or
appreciated differently by way of the arts.
2 In an article on recent debates in aesthetics, Paisley Livingston discusses what I have
called  a  “tension”  in  everyday  aesthetics  and  offers  his  own  solution  to  what  he
considers the sub-discipline’s central problem (Livingston 2015: 259). In setting up the
problem, he refers to something I said in an article sixteen years ago: “It would seem
that we need to make some sort of distinction between the aesthetics of everyday life
ordinarily experienced and the aesthetics of everyday life extraordinarily experienced.
However, any attempt to increase the aesthetic intensity of our ordinary everyday life-
experiences will tend to push those experiences in the direction of the extraordinary.
One can only conclude that there is a tension within the very concept of the aesthetics
of everyday life” (Leddy 2005: 18). The quote raised a worry which several philosophers
have tried to resolve. My own solution, briefly, is that the tension may be resolved by
seeing aesthetics in terms of levels of aesthetic experience and in terms of continuity in
a  spectrum of  aesthetic  intensity  that  ranges  from the most  mundane to  the  most
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extraordinary and intense, and in which there are dynamic and mutually enhancing
relations between the various levels.
3 Yuriko  Saito,  Allen  Carlson  and  Livingston  each  offer  their  own  solution  to  the
dilemma. In this paper, I shall argue that each of the solutions offered relies on keeping
a  strict  distinction  between  two  kinds  of  perception,  a  distinction  that  cannot  be
maintained. For Livingston, the distinction is between the practical and the aesthetic.
For  Saito,  we  need  to  keep  descriptive  distinct  from  normative  aesthetics,  and  in
particular we need to recognize that the ordinariness of the ordinary is distinct from
aesthetic “gems” we might discover in everyday experience. Carlson insists that Saito
herself has not kept to the idea insofar as her examples tend to be somewhat outside
the realm of the ordinary. Both Saito and Carlson are reacting against formalist and
aesthetic  attitude theorists.  Saito  thinks that  the aesthetic  attitude theorist  fails  to
engage with the aesthetic object. Carlson thinks that the way to resolve the dilemma is
to  set  aside  formalist  approaches  to  appreciation  of  everyday  life  which  focus  on
shallow or  surface properties  and to  focus  on engagement  with things  that  can be
known, for example an artifact’s function. I will argue for the aesthetic attitude and
engagement, but not for formalism.
4 Livingston observes that some experiences are not aesthetic experiences and yet satisfy
the  conditions  of  “perceptual  uptake  in  the  absence  of  awareness,”  and that  these
experiences often include “what is wholly commonplace and familiar” (Livingston 2015:
260).  His  example  would  be  a  person  who  makes  a  daily  commute but  pays  little
attention to the sights, sounds or smells on the route. Yet, I would argue, the commuter
is surely aware of her surroundings, including the sights of braking cars and perhaps
the smells of burning oil. Moreover, the question here is not about when unconscious
things receive perceptual uptake but about when they rise to the level of the aesthetic,
which  is  conscious.  The  commuter’s  experience  which  Livingston  seeks  to  handle
through unconscious perceptual uptake, can be better handled by talking about low-
level  aesthetic  experiences,  ones  that  can  be  described,  for  example,  by  applying
aesthetic  property terms such as “pretty,” or “nice,” or “looks good” (Leddy 2012).
Livingston might reply that my use of the term “aesthetic” is overly stretched and that
“aesthetic” should be limited to what is attended to “for its own sake.” The attention
paid to the sounds and smells of brakes and so forth is, on his view, “practical” and not
aesthetic. The issue for a Deweyan like myself is whether the “practical” can so clearly
be delineated from the aesthetic. 
5 Livingston thinks  that  the  everyday aesthetician reclassifies  a  part  of  the  world  as
within the sphere of everyday aesthetics, for example by attending to a stretch of road
aesthetically (Livingston 2015: 260). But the worry is that in doing so “the very ‘object’
of everyday aesthetics has somehow vanished or been vitiated as a result” (ibid.). And
yet if the commuter is not aware at all, if she is a kind of automaton, then she is not
having either aesthetic or non-aesthetic experience, and thus what happens to her is
not even relevant to aesthetics; whereas if she is aware, and has low-level positive, or
even negative, aesthetic experiences, then no re-classification or special philosophical
operation is needed to get her experience to the level of aesthetics. Although there is a
difference between the practical and the aesthetically sensitive commuter, it is only
that the first is attentive to more practical-oriented aesthetic qualities than the second
is.
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6 I  do not know how other people experience driving, but my way tends to alternate
between the two modes. If I smell gasoline or hear knocks in the engine I am going to
be more focused in the practical mode, and yes these smells and sounds are ugly, i.e.
negatively aesthetic. On the other hand, usually I am attending mainly to the sights
along the road, and this is a less practical-oriented form of aesthetic perception. 
7 The worry that making the ordinary extraordinary, or at least special (as I would now
put it)  keeps us from properly perceiving that which is  ordinary (because doing so
takes the subject out of the realm of the ordinary) is misplaced. The person who is
stressed by her daily commute is not helped by learning how to attend to the boring,
humdrum,  or  stressful  nature of  that  commute.  Nor  is  her  ordinary  bad  or  dull
experience  harmed by  transforming  it  into  something  better.  So  I  cannot  see  how
recontextualizing the ordinary and experiencing it as something outside the ordinary
can be a bad thing, unless it causes moral or practical problems. But to really deal with
this issue we need first to turn to Saito’s resolution of the dilemma.
 
1. Saito
8 Saito  distinguishes  between  normative  and  descriptive  dimensions  of  everyday
aesthetics,  and  finds  the  tension  of  everyday  aesthetics  as  between  these.  There
certainly  is  a  normative  dimension  to  everyday  aesthetics  in  that  many  everyday
aestheticians are trying to improve things. I agree with Saito, for example, that we need
to cultivate aesthetic literacy with respect to the everyday (Saito 2007: 243). This call
for change is ameliorative. It  says, “pay attention to this stuff,  at least some of the
time” and “an aesthetically more attentive life is a better one.” It is much like saying
that we would improve our lives if we meditated every day. Saito makes this call partly
because  she  sees  this  literacy  as  necessary  for  changes  we  need  to  make  in  our
relationship with our environment, that this is a matter of creating a more healthy,
humane and environmentally sound world (ibid.: 244).
9 Towards the end of Everyday Aesthetics she turns to the tension between the descriptive
and  normative  functions  of  everyday  aesthetics  (ibid.).  But  I  find  this  distinction
problematic, more a matter of degree or emphasis than kind. I do not see how you can
describe  everyday aesthetic  phenomena without  at  the  same time,  to  some extent,
promoting  greater  attention  to  such  phenomena.  And  doing  this  is  normative.
Moreover,  the dilemma is precisely that paying attention to the phenomena, which
description encourages, itself brackets and enhances the phenomena, ratcheting them
up to another aesthetic level. The dilemma, as I see it, is only a real one for someone
who wants to maintain strict distinctions of the sort we are discussing, and not for a
Deweyan who sees continuity and similarity between levels of experience as well as
dynamic interaction between these.
10 One  approach  to  everyday  aesthetics,  according  to  Saito,  is  to  follow  traditional
aesthetic theory with regards to the aesthetic attitude. This would be to free ourselves
from a practical attitude, i.e. from such normal ways of experiencing or reacting as
“appreciating  a  utensil  purely  for  its  functionality  or  deploring  a  dirty  linen  that
prompts us to clean it” (ibid.). Aesthetic attitude theory, on her view, would, instead,
call  on  us  to  closely  attend  to  sensuous  surfaces.  In  doing  so,  she  admits,  we  can
certainly find “hidden gems,” for example in the appearance of the linen stain. She
agrees that, in order to find these hidden gems, we turn to art, for example to poetry
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and photography, and we appreciate the help they provide. So, in her view, we are
faced with a choice between focusing on sensuous surfaces to find hidden gems and the
normal  practice  of  either  appreciating  something  for  its  functionality  or  not
appreciating something and then fixing or cleaning it. I question this choice.
11 What exactly is “appreciating a utensil purely for its functionality”? And do we ever
actually do this? I see a spoon and a cereal bowl in front of me that I have just used. I
like the way the spoon is shaped and how it works, and much prefer it to a plastic
spoon or one that has less of a soup-spoon look. The spoon has fine lines, but it also
holds  cereal  nicely.  The  cereal  bowl  is  one  we  purchased  at  a  Frank Lloyd  Wright
museum, and looks vaguely like the Guggenheim Museum in New York City. I love this
bowl, which functions perfectly for my morning cereal. However, I cannot separate in
my  mind  my  aesthetic  appreciation  of  the  bowl  from  my  appreciation  of  its
functionality.  And seeing it  as a hidden gem is just a matter of moving my already
aesthetic experience of the bowl to another level of aesthetic intensity. (Contra Saito,
hidden gems are pervasive and hardly rare.) True, I am not always contemplating these
utensils as I use them. But I choose them for my morning cereal because they look and
feel right. And there is a continuity between this and seeing them as an artist would.
12 In short, my taking an aesthetic attitude toward the bowl is not radically discontinuous
with when I  just choose it  from other bowls for my cereal.  Indeed, this lower-level
aesthetically-motivated  choice  is  pretty  strongly  related  to  the  appreciative
contemplative level. You might say that the second level involves taking an aesthetic
attitude, but it would be wrong to say that I take nothing like an aesthetic attitude when
choosing  the  bowl  for  my  cereal,  even  though  that  choosing  is  not,  in  itself,
contemplative. 
13 Nor is it fair to say, as Saito suggests, that in contemplating the bowl as an aesthetic
object,  I  am  simply  attending  to  “sensuous  surfaces.”  Of  course  I  am  attending  to
sensuous  surfaces.  But  I  am  not  merely attending  to  sensuous  surfaces  since,  in
contemplating it, I am aware of its feel in my hand, of its heft and weight and balance,
all of which go into a feeling of its fitness for its function. Surely these feels are not
surfaces, although they are sensuous. More than that, I am attending to the bowl as
indicative of an underlying reality not immediately apparent to the senses. 
Since both Saito and Carlson attack formalism, as found in Clive Bell’s theory of art
(Bell 1958), it is worth mentioning that there is an alternate interpretation of Bell’s
formalism that takes this into account. Li Zehou understands it not in terms of mere
sensuous surfaces but in terms of the social and cultural sedimentation of significance
(Zehou 1988). On this view, phenomenologically, the bowl comes with an indeterminate
and unconscious background that can be made conscious. I can, while contemplating
the bowl, attend to things that are not sensuous but are related to the bowl, such as
how it fits the definition of “bowl” or how it fits into my overall taste in design. I can
also attend to it in relation to practical matters, such as how I would feel if I broke it. A
complex phenomenology of meaning hovers around my bowl. But if I attend to this I
am still not attending to “pure functionality.” There is no such thing.
14 The case of the stained linen is somewhat different. There is, of course, a difference
between the person who looks at it as if it were a work of art and someone who looks at
it simply as something that needs cleaning. But both of these attitudes are nonetheless
aesthetic: they just focus on different properties and consequences.
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15 Webster’s defines “normative” as “of, relating to, or determining norms or standards.”
A  norm is  also  associated  with  “normal”  or  “customary.”  Saito  says  that  everyday
aesthetics functions “normatively” when we appreciate “hidden gems” with the help of
art, and that this is by way of bracketing our normal response, which is to clean up the
stain.  So  the  normative  is  not  normal?  But  which  is  more  normative  in  this  case:
cleaning up the stain or seeing it as a hidden gem? Both are normative in that both
involve  standards,  although the  second is  more  normal  if,  by  that,  we  mean more
common. This might differ according to place and time. 
16 Treating the stained linen as a hidden gem is rendering the ordinary as extraordinary,
and my earlier  writings  might  be  guilty  of  overstressing the  importance  of  this  in
everyday aesthetics. I now reject the idea of jumping all of the way from the ordinary
to the extraordinary without considering all of the intermediary steps, the continuum
of  possibilities  between  these  extremes.  Normativity  extends  all  the  way  down.
Cleaning the stained linen is normative in that the very action of making it look better
is intended to create or enhance a low-level aesthetic quality, i.e. “looks nice” or “is
clean.” 
17 But do we, as Saito puts it,  “lose something of the everyday life’s  everyday-ness or
ordinary-ness” in taking the arts-based attitude, i.e. in seeing the stained linen as if it
were, for example, an abstract painting? (Saito 2007: 245). I cannot see that anything is
lost here except that one ought not to be spending time imagining the stained linen as
work of art if one’s household job is to make sure that such things look nice.
18 Saito  calls  the  “clean  it  up”  approach  “descriptive” rather  than  normative.  But
“descriptive” is not quite the right word either. Sure, something is described in this
case: the attitude of the person who has the household job of making things clean, neat
and nice. But we may also describe the attitude of the artist who comes into the kitchen
from her studio and is mesmerized by the interesting aesthetic qualities of the stained
linen. So, overall, I do not think that the distinction between normative and descriptive
helps resolve the tension in everyday aesthetics.  However,  Saito has made us more
aware of how action in response to what we see in the world, for example cleaning and
throwing away, is as important aesthetically as experience that is more detached and
contemplative (ibid.). 
19 The  question  may  be  a  matter  of  when.  When  should  we  make  the  ordinary
extraordinary and when should we focus on achieving the low-level aesthetic results
indicated by “neat,” “nice,” and so forth, i.e. results that are not always associated with
the term “aesthetic” (which is why Saito calls them “seemingly non-aesthetic”)? If you
do the first too often you have what Saito calls “indiscriminate aestheticization.” What
happens if  everything is  experienced as  extraordinary,  as  a  hidden gem? Well,  the
result could be pretty disastrous! The dirty linen would never be cleaned. Yet, how bad
is it really to promote more art-like experiences of everyday life? 
20 Livingston  interprets  Saito’s  descriptive  mode  as  trying  to  represent  everyday  life
faithfully (Livingston 2015: 261). But representing everyday life faithfully is not just a
matter of representing the need to clean up stained linen. It also involves representing
the experience of seeing the stained linen as if it were art, or of seeing it as an artist
would. These are all sides of everyday life, even though the second and third relate
more to the everyday lives of artists, poets, and other aesthetically sensitive people.
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21 I suppose the problem is that you have to stop seeing the linen as needing a cleaning to
see it as an aesthetic gem or at least as aesthetically enhanced. But there is nothing to
keep us from alternating between the two perspectives, or even combining them to
some extent. Consider that, in washing dishes, one can enjoy the qualities of cleanliness
as they emerge in the cleaning process in an intensified way quite different from the
ordinary experience. And consider that this can be done if one practices “mindfulness”
in the Buddhist tradition described by Thich Nhất Hạnh (1999).
 
2. Livingston’s Solution
22 Livingston’s own solution is to move to the level of aesthetic properties. On his view,
everyday aesthetics is “the subfield that investigates the aesthetic properties of items
not falling in the categories of scenic nature or the fine arts” Livingston (2015: 261).
Talking about aesthetic properties is fine. However, almost all aesthetic property terms
may be applied to both art and everyday life. Both artworks and flower arrangements
can be called “beautiful,” “pretty,” or just “nice.” Sure, some terms are used more often
in the arts, for example “powerful,” and some more often in everyday life, for example
“cute.” However, pointing this out is no solution the dilemma. Again, the dilemma is
only a dilemma if you think there is something disturbing about the thought that low-
level aesthetic experiences are enhanced when attended to and when understood or
appreciated  differently  by  way  of  the  arts;  it  is  only  a  dilemma  if  you  think  that
something important is lost in doing this. 
23 Livingston  develops  his  own  solution  in  terms  of  a  strict  distinction  between  the
practical  on  the  one  hand  and  “intrinsic  valence”  of  experience  on  the  other
(Livingston 2015: 261). This, he believes, is the clear dividing line between that which is
everyday aesthetics and that which is not. The intrinsic valence is seen to be positive
but always instantaneous, as when the nose of a fine wine “is instantly rewarding,” or
the immediate sensation of pain has “a negative valence” (ibid.: 262). Yet how is this
distinction going to help solve the problem? A strict distinction between practical and
intrinsic cannot be maintained any more than a distinction between appreciation of
functionality and appreciation of surface features where one can happen without the
other.  Moreover,  this  approach  ignores  the  continuum  between  instantaneous  and
slowly evolving appreciation.
24 Livingston  thinks  that  everyday  aesthetics  needs  a  contrast  between  two  kinds  of
experience. In the first kind, the primary object of attention is the agent’s goal. These
“instrumental  experiences”  are  contrasted  to  experiences  that  focus  on  intrinsic
valence which is described as “whatever makes the experience positively or negatively
valued  intrinsically  or  for  its  own  sake”  (ibid.).  Aesthetic  experience  is  when  the
intrinsic  value  is  predominant  over  the  instrumental  value.  Value  by  way  of
contemplation is “inherent value” of which aesthetic value is one type. For Livingston,
(drawing from Lewis  1946),  “[c]ontemplation of  what  is  immediately  presented”  is,
finally, crucial to aesthetic experience (Livingston 2015: 263). This all depends on the
kind of radical  distinction between the practical  and the contemplative that Dewey
would reject.
25 Livingston explicates his solution of the dilemma of everyday aesthetics in terms of a
story of three fictional characters named Yukiko. We need concern ourselves only with
Yukiko1 and 2 since Yukiko3, who focuses on negative aesthetic qualities, raises no new
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problems. Yukiko 1 receives a gift  of wa-gashi from a suitor and considers what his
choice indicates about his discernment and taste. She then attends to the “practical
problem” of undoing the package without damaging the materials, which is “the only
proper way to do it.” After that, she sets it aside. Yukiko2, by contrast, “experiences a
mild  pleasure  as  she  examines  the  exquisite  packaging”  and  “relishes  the  cakes.”
Livingston  then says,  “it  strikes  me as  uncontroversial  to  observe  that  our  second
Yukiko has an aesthetic experience, while the first one does not” (ibid.: 264). In short,
Livingston seeks to resolve the dilemma by blocking any way to consider the level of
the practical, that of Yukiko1, as aesthetic.
26 Yet Yukiko1 may well be having aesthetic experience, depending on how one defines it.
Again,  I  may  be  accused  of  overextending  the  term  “aesthetic”  here  but,  in  the
Deweyan tradition, I see continuity where others see radical division. As Yukiko1 looks
at the wa-gashi gift she considers issues of taste. Although she may not be focusing on
the surface qualities of the item as such, she needs to take these into account as she
evaluates  the  taste  of  her  suitor.  Although  she  is  more  focused  on  background
considerations than Yukiko2, these features, for example whether or not her suitor is
“elegant”  or  “tasteful,”  are  aesthetic.  Moreover,  Yukiko1  engages  in  an  activity,
unwrapping a package, which is done in “the only proper way,” where “proper” is used
aesthetically, much like “clean” in the case of the dirty linen. Livingston is correct that
both  Yukikos  are  responding  to  the  same  object  differently,  but  they  are both
responding aesthetically.
27 Both Yukikos’  activities involve a heightening of significance,  a heightening which I
have called in my book “increase of aura” (Leddy 2012). Perhaps the second Yukiko
attends to the gift in a different or more intensified way than the first. Perhaps she is at
a “higher level,” although it is hard to say so without more information. Yukiko1 may,
too, be having an aesthetic experience in her evaluation of the taste of her suitor by
way of aesthetic evaluation of his gift. This is not to deny that there are other, non-
aesthetic, aspects of her experience.
28 Livingston writes that, “[i]n her concern for social distinction, the first Yukiko misses
out on an aesthetic experience, even if she accurately classifies the packaging’s place in
a hierarchy of goods” (Livingston 2015: 265). He imagines her as “vain, self-absorbed
and sadly  obsessed  with  her  relations  to  other[s]”  (ibid.).  He  also  stresses  that  her
experience is  constituted in terms of  her  “proud sense of  her  status  or  identity  in
relation to the suitor; in short, her social distinction” (ibid.), assuming that such a self-
directed attitude cannot be included in aesthetic experience. But he also, interestingly,
describes her as “a young woman of leisure with ability to attend to objects around her
with discernment…” This would make her experience potentially aesthetic, according
to, for example, Humean guidelines. To be sure, she is not admirable as a person, and
yet she may still be having aesthetic experience. 
29 Livingston says that Yukiko1’s pleasure is not aesthetic but rather “immediate delight
in  acquiring an expensive  object”  (ibid.).  By  contrast,  the  second Yukiko is  focused
correctly on the quality of the packaging, which concern is not “overshadowed” by
practical considerations (i.e. how expensive the object is). The first Yukiko’s experience
is,  according to Livingston, “instrumental,” for she “fails to appreciate the inherent
aesthetic  value  of  the  packaging…” (ibid.).  It  is  this  radical  distinction between the
instrumental and the inherent that the Deweyan would question. 
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3. Allen Carlson
30 The third theorist I would like to consider is Allen Carlson. Carlson correctly describes
the key elements of my theory, as set forth in my book, in which I introduce the idea of
“aura”  in  the  tradition  of  disinterestedness  although  enhanced  by  my  own
understanding of Bullough’s notion of “psychical distance” as imaginative perception
(Bullough  1912).  Carlson  writes,  along  similar  lines  to  Saito,  that  my  “account  is
explicitly  not  an  aesthetics  of  everyday  life  ordinarily  experienced…[and]  cannot
resolve  the  dilemma of  everyday aesthetics”  (Carlson 2014:  59).  He  thinks  I  should
recognize that everyday aesthetics is not about the extraordinary. I agree, and yet the
very title of my book, The Extraordinary In the Ordinary, stresses the ordinary. The focus
is on the ordinary and what is to be found in it.
31 There  is  some  ambiguity  in  the  phrase  “aesthetics  of  everyday  life  ordinarily
experienced.” In one meaning,  my approach is  providing such an account in that  I
recognize, list and categorize a wide variety of ordinary experiences in everyday life
that involve low-level aesthetic experience, for example when one selects a shirt to
wear in the morning because it “looks nice.” Very low-level aesthetic experiences of
this sort have low level “aura” in my sense of the term (i.e. give a heightened sense of
significance), in contrast to things that have even less aesthetic value, or none at all.
Although I admit that the term “extraordinary” should be reserved for high points in
aesthetic experience, it is still true that the aesthetic takes us out of the ordinariness of
the ordinary, the boringness of the boring, and the dullness of the dull. 
32 Carlson favors the theory of Arnold Berleant, who sees engagement as the criterion of
the aesthetic,  for resolving the dilemma (Berleant 1997).  He correctly observes that
Berleant rejects various dichotomies, for example between subject and object. From a
Deweyan perspective, this is good. Yet Berleant holds vigorously to one dichotomy, that
between  disinterested  and  engaged  perception,  which  I  question.  On  my  view,
engagement  can,  and  ultimately  must,  incorporate  moments  of  distancing  or
disinterested perception, i.e. detachment from practicality and cognition. It is nearly
impossible to engage with a tree aesthetically if  it  is about to fall  on you, and it  is
difficult to scientifically analyze something and aesthetically appreciate it at the same
time. Berleant thinks disinterested engagement a contradiction in terms. I think the
contradiction is momentary at best, and that proper engagement involves a process of
toggling between disinterested and interested perception, which ultimately synthesizes
the two. Similarly, in art appreciation, although one can look at a Rembrandt portrait
either in a formalist way or through strong emphasis on historical context, the best
result comes from toggling between these two to gain a holistic understanding. This is
also true in everyday life.
33 Another thing neglected by Berleant’s view is the important role played by imagination
in engagement. Berleant calls on the appreciator to immerse himself in the object of
appreciation. But it is only through imagination (or through mindfulness, which I will
discuss in the next section) that we can identify with what we perceive. In addition, it is
only through imagination that  an object  seems to have greater significance than it
would have if it were pure sense data. Imagination (and/or mindfulness) is required for
engagement, and imagination intensifies. I do not see how one can engage with what
Carlson  calls  “the  mundane,  common,  routine,  humdrum,  banal,  and  even  just
downright uninteresting” without making the very things so-labeled less mundane, etc.
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The dilemma of everyday aesthetics is resolved only by recognizing this. The problem
with the cognitivism that Carlson, Parsons and others advocate is that it leaves out the
important dimension of imagination as also the way in which certain things can be
experienced  in  a  sensuously  intensified  way  that  involves  no  element  of  cognition
(Carlson & Parsons 2009).
34 Although Carlson thinks that Berleant’s view can solve the dilemma as I posed it, he
discerns a successor dilemma, which needs resolution through another strategy. It is
the question of how one motivates focus on the everyday as everyday given that it is
uninteresting.  His  solution  is  his  cognitivism  since  background  information,  for
example about the intended functions of artifacts, makes things interesting. But there
are two senses of “interesting,” one of which is cognitive, but another simply means
aesthetically engaging. The everyday is not uninteresting in the second sense, and so
there is no problem of motivation.
35 Carlson concludes his essay with a critique of Saito’s way of appreciating a baseball
game, a way that includes not only smells and tastes (the hot dog) but also art-like
features of baseball. His view is that appreciation cannot be motivated or maintained
without knowledge of the game (Carlson 2014: 64). I am on the side of Saito here: a
baseball game can be appreciated aesthetically from a number of different angles, and
Carlson’s point can only be relevant if we are talking about appreciation of a baseball
game qua baseball game. The experience of a baseball game can be framed in different
ways,  and  it  is  not  the  case  that  only  the  baseball  expert  can  have  a  good  time
(aesthetically speaking) at a game. A photographer, for example, can have a great time
while knowing little about the actual game. This, of course, can be true while conceding
that the main reason for going to a baseball game is to enjoy a baseball game and that
this is what motivates most people. 
36 But we should also note that baseball is very much like art in that rules are central to
what happens and what is appreciated. Baseball and other formal games are as much
unlike everyday life experiences (like making a meal or taking a shower) as are fine art
experiences.  So,  to use the appreciation of baseball  as baseball  as the paradigm for
appreciation of everyday life, is problematic. Appreciation of a cup of coffee, a walk, a
shower,  an  outfit,  or  a  baby  playing,  does  not  require  any  knowledge  of  history,
traditions or rules, although such knowledge is often useful. 
37 So,  although cognitivist  aesthetics  is  valuable  as  an  approach to  appreciating  such
things as baseball games qua baseball games, and can be valuable in conjunction with
imaginative perception or mindfulness, it does not resolve the dilemma of everyday
aesthetics.  What  does  resolve the dilemma is  to  take the pluralist  approach I  have
described, along with a recognition that there are gradations of intensity ranging from
low-level aesthetic experiences to ones that are extraordinary. Where does motivation
come from? It  comes from mindful and imaginative perception being engaging and
pleasurable.
 
4. Saito on the Aesthetics of the Familiar
38 In her more recent book, Aesthetics of the Familiar, Saito returns to the issue at hand
arguing that everyday aesthetics ought to be understood primarily in terms not of a list
of  objects  but  of  an  attitude  (Saito  2017:  10). She  describes  this  attitude,  towards
everyday  objects  and activities,  in  terms  of  pragmatic  considerations  involved  in
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accomplishing tasks,  although she admits that,  in everyday contexts,  preoccupation
with accomplishing a certain task often eclipses its aesthetic potentials (ibid.). 
39 I agree some situations are just pragmatic (or, as I prefer, “practical”). In these cases,
one is not noticing or otherwise responding to any aesthetic features. Say I notice that
my tire is flat. There is no time for contemplation or appreciation. I do not even see the
flat tire in negative aesthetic terms. I have to engage in a course of action, must refill
the tire and find a place that will fix the leak. To be sure, after the whole project is over,
I can reconstitute the event, perhaps by incorporating it into a story I tell, as a low-
level example of “an experience” in Dewey’s sense. But the practical side of repairing a
tire requires nothing aesthetic… except in the minimal sense that, after repair, the tire
now looks, once again, “right.”
40 But  what  is  this  everyday  attitude  of  which  Saito  speaks?  She  agrees  with  Ossi
Naukkarinen  when  he  says  that  “[t]he  everyday  attitude  is  colored  with  routines,
familiarity,  continuity,  normalcy,  habits,  the  slow  process  of  acclimatization,  even
superficiality  and  a  sort  of  half-consciousness  and  not  with  creative  experiments,
exceptions,  constant  questionings  and…  deep  reflections”  (Saito  2017:  10;  and
Naukkarinen 2013). Call this the attitude of familiarity. 
41 But  what  makes  this the  “everyday attitude”?  Haven’t  Saito  and Naukkarinen both
admitted  that  what  is  everyday  for  one  person  might  not  be  for  another?  What
Naukkarinen describes here is not the everyday attitude of a creative artist, thinker,
philosopher, poet, musician, or nature lover. Nor is it the everyday attitude of anyone
who has a zest for life and an urge to create. I would suggest that the everyday attitude
of  the  familiar,  as  described  by  Naukkarinen,  is  a  less-than-optimal  attitude  for
approaching  everyday  life.  It  is  an  alienated,  because  only  half-conscious  and
superficial, attitude… an attitude to be noted but “got beyond.” However, if we focus on
the first part of the Naukkarinen quote it could be seen instead as describing, more
positively, a domain of the habitual and routine in which focus is placed on mindful
self-actualization. Perhaps this is what Saito has in mind. 
42 Saito is right that the person whose job is to package artworks may be satisfied or not
with her wrapping job, and that this is part of everyday aesthetics. She is right that that
person’s attitude will be different from the attitude of the art connoisseur. However, as
I will argue, it will not be the attitude of “the familiar” in Naukkarinen’s sense if it is to
have anything aesthetic to it.
43 Yet Saito endorses Naukkarinen’s idea that, in addition to an art-like pole to everyday
aesthetics, there is another pole that includes such things as household chores towards
which we take what she considers a non-aesthetic, pragmatic attitude. She refers to
this pole as “more physical in nature” (Saito 2017: 11).  She also believes that these
things form “the core of everyday aesthetics” (ibid.). How can the core of something
aesthetic be non-aesthetic? When we take a non-aesthetic attitude towards these things
for  pragmatic  purposes  they  are  not  aesthetic  and  hence  not  part  of  everyday
aesthetics. 
44 Although I agree that daily chores can be approached aesthetically, I believe this is by
way  of  a  different  kind  of  attitude,  the  aesthetic  attitude.  And,  when  they  are
approached aesthetically, they rise a bit above the humdrum and merely pragmatic.
They  cannot  be  part  of  the  core  of  everyday  aesthetics,  or  even  part  of  everyday
aesthetics, if there is nothing aesthetic about them.
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45 Perhaps  for  Saito  and  Naukkarinen,  the  aesthetic  nature  of  these  “more  physical”
activities is unconscious, and the important contrast here is between conscious and
unconscious aesthetic experience. Yet, as I argued at the beginning of this paper, surely
some  level  of  consciousness  is  required  for  anything  to  be  either  aesthetic  or
experiential. So the most plausible theory is that there are experiences that seem at
first completely non-aesthetic, but actually have an aesthetic charge, albeit one that
the actors might not be fully conscious of. 
46 Saito  is  mainly  opposed  to  the  idea  that  everyday  aesthetics  requires  a
defamiliarization of the familiar. But she seems only to be thinking of the high-level
forms of defamiliarization. If she could accept low-level forms then there would be no
disagreement.  And  I  think  she  does, implicitly.  Thich  Nhất  Hạnh  the  previously
mentioned Zen Buddhist philosopher, speaks of mindfulness in washing dishes (Nhất
Hạnh 1999). Saito also speaks positively of mindfulness. Washing dishes definitely falls
into  the  category  of  activity  that  is  “familiar,  routine  and  ordinary,”  the  category
which  Saito  sees  as  central  to  everyday  aesthetics.  For  me,  mindfulness  weakly
defamiliarizes washing dishes by bringing the activity somewhat out of the ordinary. As
I see it, what is central to everyday aesthetics is that it involves everyday experience
made special, to borrow a term from Ellen Dissanayake (Dissanayake 2009). One way this
can  happen  is  when  we  are  mindful,  as  long  as  the  resultant  experience  has  an
aesthetic charge.
47 Saito describes the position she opposes in this way: “In order for [everyday life] to be
foregrounded as the object of aesthetics, it has to be illuminated in some way to render
it out-of-the-ordinary, unfamiliar, or strange: it needs to be defamiliarized.” Further,
“aesthetic experience promotes a radically sensitized acuity of perception that is the
antithesis  of  everyday  inattentiveness.”  Thus,  “the  everyday must  be  rescued from
oblivion by being transformed; the all too prosaic must be made to reveal its hidden
subversive poetry” (Saito 2017: 11). Yet this all seems right to me, although revealing
hidden subversive poetry might describe a particularly high level of defamiliarization.
48 In order to attack this position Saito discusses some forms of defamiliarization that are
deeply unpleasant, for example the one described in Sartre’s Nausea of a situation in
which everything takes on such a strongly defamiliarized look that it is overwhelming.
She describes the hero of the novel, Roquentin, as losing the usual control of existence
we maintain through conceptualization. In this, he fails to “experience ordinary objects
in their benign everyday aspect.” Hence his nausea.
49 Saito is suggesting that this form of extreme defamiliarization negates a kind of low-
level aesthetically positive thing of which we are seldom conscious, which Roquentin
refers  to  as  the  “everyday  aspect,”  and  that  this  aspect  can  be  recovered  only  by
returning to control based on conceptualization. But I think reinstituting conceptual
control  goes  too  far,  that  perception  under  concepts,  particularly  literal  concepts,
inhibits aesthetic experience when not combined with a moment of direct sensuous
experience.  Perhaps  the  real  solution  is  simply  to  come  down  from  high-level
defamiliarization. 
50 Roquentin is described as experiencing the tree as having “lost the harmless look of an
abstract  category”  and  becoming  an  aspect  of  a  larger  material  obscene  “paste”
without individuality. This is indeed a very strong negative aesthetic experience. And it
may reveal, by its very absence, something we are not always conscious of, i.e. that
being able to categorize and individualize things is comforting. But this comfort only
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has aesthetic value if  it  goes beyond mere categorization. And, as I  have suggested,
categorization, when abstract, is precisely what keeps us from experiencing things as
having the kind of presence I call “aura.”
51 Saito thinks that, “the most comfortable mode of our interaction with things around us
requires  an  act  of  intellectual  knowing  that  gives  us  a  power  to  control  them  by
organizing,  categorizing  and  classifying  them”  (Saito  2017:  15).  I  agree  that
“comfortable” can be an aesthetic quality, but is categorizing sufficient to generate it? 
52 Saito believes, a “move to turn the mundane, everyday, humdrum into an aesthetic
treasure trove is an attempt to extend the time-honored aesthetic attitude theory to
everyday life” (ibid.: 19). She finds this problematic since it is only one part of everyday
aesthetics  and can  only  happen  against  the  background  of  (or  by  way  of  contrast
against) the familiar, ordinary and mundane. Further, to try to make everything special
is to make specialness disappear. You want to balance art-like experiences of a paper
clip with using it to neaten up the workspace.
53 Saito and I are closer on this point than it may, at first, seem. For example, as I argued
in an early paper (Leddy 1995), neatness is an aesthetic property, although at a very low
level of intensity. So we agree that using a paper clip to neaten up a desk can be an
example of everyday aesthetics. Where we disagree is more on the relevance of Dewey’s
concept of “an experience” (LW.10: 42-63). Many hold that “an experience” cannot be
helpful in defining everyday aesthetics because it is too committed to being something
grand, as in a meal at a fine restaurant. But, for Dewey, “an experience” can also be
something as simple as being satisfied with repairing one’s car (ibid.: 11). What is really
at issue here is how to approach what Dewey called “the humdrum” (ibid.: 47). Note
that  Dewey  here  considers  the  humdrum  an  enemy  of  the  aesthetic  (which  “the
practical” is not) and associates it with submission to convention.
54 The main problem Saito has with defamiliarization, as we have seen throughout this
paper,  is  that it  seems to negate the everydayness of the everyday. She and others
worry that treating everyday experience as art-like, which is what defamiliarization
does,  involves  disloyalty  to  the  particularity  of  such  experience.  She  adds  that
scrutinizing the object in the way we might a work of art violates the flow of everyday
experience.
55 Dewey thought that art refines and intensifies everyday experience, and it is true that
this  involves  providing  some  structure  where  there  was  none  before.  However,
providing structure is also part of everyday experience. We provide structure when we
recount an experience we had to someone else in the form of a story with a beginning,
middle and end. Recounting the events of our lives, including our dreams, is part of
what it means to experience everyday life aesthetically. Some of the “flow” is lost in
this transformation, but not all of it. After all, flow is characteristic, as an intensified
quality, in both artistic and art-like experience.
56 As we have seen, much of Saito’s position involves rejecting, or at least downgrading,
the aesthetic attitude. In my book I defended Bullough’s take on this, particularly in his
account of experiencing a fog at sea from a “distanced” perspective (Bullough 1912). I
believe that distancing provides us with the possibility to perceive metaphorically, and
not  just  under  the  standard  categories.  (Ironically,  seeing  a  thing  as  itself  in  a
heightened  way,  as  happens  in  mindfulness,  is  in  my view a  kind  of  metaphorical
seeing.) 
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57 As I have just argued, I think that the aesthetic attitude can do the job that Saito thinks
it  cannot.  In  particular,  I  think it  is  wrong for  everyday aesthetics  to  abandon the
aesthetic attitude for the sort of attitude that Naukkarinen recommends, an attitude
that fails to bring out metaphorical qualities and that seems limited to a quiescent non-
creative approach to everyday life. As I have said previously, “any attempt to increase
the aesthetic  intensity  of  our  ordinary  everyday  life-experiences  will  tend  to  push
those experiences in the direction of the extraordinary.” This does not mean that they
must become extraordinary: the emphasis is on “in the direction of.” 
58 Saito agrees with Carlson that my concept of “aura” does not resolve the dilemma, and
I concede that, by itself, it does not. Perhaps the dilemma needs a complex response. Or
perhaps there really is no dilemma at all, or just a dilemma for those who, like Carlson,
think  we  have  to  choose  between  formalist  and  cognitivist  appreciation,  or,  like
Livingston,  between  the  practical  and  the  intrinsically  valuable.  Saito  thinks  the
dilemma  cannot  be  resolved  (as  Carlson  would  resolve  it)  simply  by  introducing
cognitive understanding, since such understanding, say of how a knife works, is needed
to properly experience both the extraordinary performance of a knife-swallower and
something as everyday as watching one’s mother skillfully cut vegetables. The idea of
“aura” helps here since it indicates how something experienced aesthetically seems to
go beyond or rise above the merely humdrum. 
59 Saito says experiencing the ordinary as ordinary offers the core of everyday aesthetic
experience whereas I think that “making special” does. Making special is what gives
something aura in my sense. When Saito says that “putting something on our conscious
radar  and  making  something  visible  does  not  necessarily  render  our  experience
extraordinary” (Saito  2017:  24).  I  must  now agree,  but  I  still  insist  that  it  must  go
beyond the merely practical.
60 There are different ways to pay attention. On the realist model, there are properties
already out there in the world, including aesthetic properties, and we can either attend
to these or not. Another model is more Deweyan and pragmatist. It sees properties as
neither fully objective nor fully subjective and as emergent on the interaction of the
live creature and the surrounding environment. I advocate this pragmatist model of
paying attention. One aspect of the pragmatist model is that it does not exclude the
affective  element  of experience  since  it  does  not  isolate  the  subjective  from  the
objective.  “Paying attention,”  on this  model  always  has  an affective  aspect.  And of
course this also means that it always has an evaluative aspect. I go perhaps a bit further
than Dewey in insisting that paying attention also requires emergence of aura. Let’s call
this  the  pragmatist/romantic  conception  of  paying  attention,  although I  think  this
conception is also present in Dewey implicitly.
61 Again,  whereas  Saito  says  that  “[b]ringing  background  to  the  foreground  through
paying attention contrasts with conducting everyday life on autopilot,” I  think that
when we pay attention in a pragmatist/romantic way to, say, washing dishes, it is not 
that real background is now foregrounded but rather that a potential is actualized: the
potential of real experience comes out where routinized mechanical experience existed
before.  Both Saito and I  (and Dewey and Nhất  Hạnh) want to get beyond chopping
vegetables mindlessly. We all favor mindfulness. But how to interpret “mindfulness”? I
would not interpret it in a realist fashion since the realist interpretation leaves out
affective/evaluative content and provides no basis for the experience of “aura” which
is necessary, on my view, for the whole thing to be aesthetic. How a Buddhist would
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interpret it depends on the form of Buddhism: there are certain forms that seem more




62 We have seen that  the relatively  new field  of  everyday aesthetics  seems to  have a
dilemma in that whenever the phenomena of everyday life are attended to aesthetically
they are raised above the merely mundane, and thus we lose the very ordinariness of
the ordinary.  The solution to this  dilemma, I  have argued,  is  to recognize that  the
relationship  between  the  ordinary  and  the  extraordinary  is  both  continuous  and
dynamic involving constant  interaction between levels  of  the aesthetic.  Raising the
humdrum somewhat out of  the humdrum either through mindfulness,  imagination,
seeing like an artist, or application of the aesthetic attitude is a good thing. It is the
ideal of everyday aesthetics as a practice rather than something to be rejected so as to
give credit to the dullness of the dull. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BELL Clive, (1958), Art, New York, Capricorn Books.
BERLEANT Arnold, (1997), Living in the Landscape: Toward an Aesthetics of Environment, Lawrence,
Kansas, University Press of Kansas.
BULLOUGH Edward, (1912), “‘Psychic Distance’ as a Factor in Art and as an Aesthetic Principle,” 
British Journal of Psychology, 5, 87-117.
CARLSON Allen, (2014), “The Dilemma of Everyday Aesthetics,” in L. Yuedi & C. L. Carter (eds), 
Aesthetics of Everyday Life, Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
CARLSON Allen & Glenn PARSONS, (2009), Functional Beauty, New York, Oxford University Press.
DEWEY John, (1989), Art as Experience, in The Later Works, 1925-1953, Volume 10: 1934 (LW.10), J. A.
Boydston (ed.), Carbondale and Edwardsville, Southern Illinois University Press. 
DISSANAYAKE Ellen, (1990), What is Art For?, Seattle, University of Washington Press.
LEDDY Thomas, (1995), “Everyday Surface Aesthetic Qualities: ‘Neat,’ ‘Messy,’ ‘Clean,’ ‘Dirty’,”
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 53, 259-68. 
LEDDY Thomas, (2005), “The Nature of Everyday Aesthetics,” in A. Light & J. M. Smith (eds), The
Aesthetics of Everyday Life, New York, Columbia University Press.
LEDDY Thomas, (2012), The Extraordinary in the Ordinary: The Aesthetics of Everyday Life,
Peterborough, On., Broadview. 
LEWIS Clarence Irving, (1946), An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, La Salle, Il., Open Court. 
A Deweyan Approach to the Dilemma of Everyday Aesthetics
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XIII-1 | 2021
14
LIVINGSTON Paisley Nathan, (2015), “New Directions in Aesthetics,” in A. C. Ribeiro (ed.), The
Bloomsbury Companion to Aesthetics, New York, Bloomsbury Academic. 
NHẤT Hạnh Thich, (1999), The Miracle of Mindfulness: An Introduction to the Practice of Meditation, 
Boston, Mass., Beacon Press.
NAUKKARINEN Ossi, (2013), “What is ‘Everyday’ in Everyday Aesthetics?,” Contemporary Aesthetics,
11. Online: (https://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=675).
SAITO Yuriko, (2007), Everyday Aesthetics, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
SAITO Yuriko, (2017), Aesthetics of the Familiar: Everyday Life and World‐Making, Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
ZEHOU Li, (1988), The Path of Beauty: A Study of Chinese Aesthetics, tr. G. Lizeng, Beijing, Morning
Glory Publishers.
NOTES
1. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for help in this formulation.
ABSTRACTS
Everyday  aesthetics  is  a  new  sub-discipline  of  aesthetic  theory  that  has  only  been  actively
discussed since the 1980s. This paper addresses what many consider the central issue of the field,
called “the dilemma of  everyday aesthetics.”  I  discuss  three authors  who address  this  issue:
Yuriko Saito,  Allen Carlson, and Paisley Livingston. Drawing on Dewey’s anti-dualist stance, I
argued for  a  continuity between the aesthetics  of  everyday life  and the aesthetics  of  art.  In
course  of  my discussion,  I  question such dichotomies  as  that  between the  practical  and the
aesthetic, the ordinary and the extraordinary, and disinterestedness vs. engagement. In my view,
the dilemma is only real for those who wish to maintain relatively rigid distinctions within these
dichotomies. The dilemma is only a dilemma if you think there is something disturbing about the
thought  that  low-level  aesthetic  experiences  are  enhanced  when  attended  to  and  when
understood or appreciated differently by way of the arts. 
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